We examine whether a corruption scandal in which the incumbent is does reduce trust in local government. We use a novel dataset containing information on local corruption scandals reported in Spain during the period 1999-2009, and data on the level of trust expressed in local politicians drawn from a new survey conducted in late 2009. We use matching methods to improve the identification of the effect of corruption scandals on trust, comparing municipalities affected by a scandal with those presenting similar traits but in which no scandal had been reported. We find that corruption scandals have a marked negative effect on trust in local politicians. This effect is even more marked in the case of individuals that have no ideological attachment to the party accused of corruption and/or who obtain their information from the media. Several falsification tests, based on a sample of corruption scandals reported after the survey had been conducted, confirm the causal interpretation of these results.
INTRODUCTION
Widespread political corruption is commonly viewed as constituting a severe threat to public trust in political institutions. After all, one of the principles underpinning a democratic political system is the presumption that governments are accountable to citizens (Przeworski et al., 1999) . As such, the abuse of the public power entrusted to elected government officials undermines these procedures of accountability (Bardhan, 1997) and corruption systematically erodes democratic principles and the faith of citizens in the political process. As a result, disaffected citizens are liable to withdraw from the electoral process (Chong et al., 2011) , or they may even resort to less legitimate means of protest as they seek radical changes in the system (Mihsler and Rose, 1997; Kostadinova, 2009) .
Several papers have shown that corruption does indeed have a negative effect on trust in government (see, e.g., Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Chang and Chu, 2006; Bowler and Karp, 2004; Kumlin and Esaiasson, 2012, among others) . However, doubts remain as to whether these negative effects can actually be interpreted to be causal.
Most of the empirical studies rely on measures of 'perception of corruption' and 'statements of trust' obtained form the same survey (e.g., Chang and Chu, 2006) , and so it is likely that both responses reflect the same underlying individual characteristics.
Even papers using more appropriate corruption measures (e.g., Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Bowler and Karp, 2004) face serious identification issues, since they compare units (usually countries) that not only present different levels of corruption but differences with regard to many other dimensions. Here, the impaired ability It is well know that the ability of regression analysis in adjusting for differences in observed covariates is reduced when between-group differences in these covariates are substantial (e.g., Cochran, 1965; Rubin, 2001) . Moreover, none of these studies addresses the possibility that corruption and trust might be affected at the same time by influences that are not observable to the researcher (see, e.g., Uslaner, 2004) .
The main contribution of our paper therefore is the use of an improved identification strategy, based on the use of matching methods complemented with falsification tests. The use of this empirical strategy is possible thanks to the availability of a novel data set providing information on a recent wave of local corruption scandals in Spain and data drawn from a new survey of trust in local government. Thus, we know whether a municipality has experienced at least one corruption scandal (defined as a "public allegation of corruption brought to light by a newspaper") during the three terms-of-office previous to our survey, while the trust survey contains information about the stated level of trust in local government among a sample of individuals in municipalities affected by a corruption scandal before the survey was carried out vs. municipalities in which no scandal was reported. The control group was selected using matching techniques and so it comprises corrupt-free municipalities that are identical in terms of observables to the corrupt-ridden municipalities. Interestingly, some of the municipalities that were corrupt-free before the survey was conducted were affected by corruption scandals in subsequent years. It is precisely this fact that allows us to design 'falsification' tests to confirm (or discard) the causal interpretation of our results. This paper makes an additional contribution: it is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to analyse the effect of corruption scandals involving local incumbents on the level of trust in the local government. Earlier studies have focused on the determinants of trust in local government (Rahn and Rudolph, 2005) , but they do not address the effect of corruption. Others have analysed the effect of local government performance and corruption on the level of trust in politicians in general, but they do not study the effect on trust in local politicians (Weitz-Shapiro, 2008) . Some papers have studied the effect of corruption on local electoral turnout (Escaleras et al., 2012 Chong et al., 2011 1 ) but none examines its impact on local trust. Clearly, focusing on trust in local government is interesting in its own right, given the implications of such findings for any evaluation of decentralization reforms 2 , and also because local governments can be considered an essential part of any democratic system 3 .
The results of our analysis suggest that, on average, corruption scandals involving local government do have a negative and non-negligible effect on trust in local politicians. This effect is even more marked in the case of individuals that have no ideological attachment to the party accused of corruption and/or who obtain their 1 Our paper is also related to that line in the literature which seeks to determine whether corrupt incumbents are punished at the polls (see, e.g., Peters and Welch, 1980; Dimock and Jacobson, 1995; and Welch and Hibbing, 1997 , for the US; Chang et al., 2010, for Italy; Ferraz and Finan, 2005, for Brazil; Larcinese and Sircar, 2012, and Eggers, 2013 , for the UK; and Costas et al., 2012, and Barberá et al., 2013, for Spain) . 2 Local government is the tier closest to the citizens and any evaluation will depend largely on how accountable it is to local residents (Bardhan, 1997) . Local corruption scandals might erode confidence in local government and generate demands for greater centralization. 3 The establishment of elected local governments is a crucial step in the development of new democracies and, in fact, often precedes the democratization of the country at higher levels (see, e.g. Martínez-Bravo, 2014) . The effect of scandals on trust in local government is often a prelude to what will happen at other tiers since local scandals have ramifications for politicians at higher layers.
information from the media (as opposed to on the grapevine or from local government itself). Several falsification tests confirm the causal interpretation of these results. We show, for example, that scandals reported after the survey was conducted had no influence on the stated levels of trust. We also show that scandals breaking out before the 2007 local election had an effect on turnout in that contest, but that scandals that occurred after that event did not have any effect on turnout. Overall, these results suggest that the effects of corruption on trust can be interpreted as causal.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the previous literature on corruption and trust, focusing first on the different empirical approaches used. The third section provides some background for the analysis by describing the recent surge in local corruption scandals in Spain and the current discussion regarding how this affects trust in government and the legitimacy of the country's political institutions.
Section four describes the data (i.e., corruption database and trust survey) and the methods. Section five presents the results. The last section concludes.
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

Perceptions of corruption. Most papers studying the effects of corruption on trust in
government use individual responses to questions on 'perception of corruption' and 'statements of trust' in government (e.g., Seligson, 2002; Chang and Chu, 2006; Morris and Klesner, 2010) 4 . The results of most of these studies suggest that countries with higher levels of corruption do indeed show lower levels of trust in government. It is not clear, however, whether this result is indicative of a mere correlation between variables or whether it can be interpreted as a causal effect. The main concern with this approach is that it is affected by the 'chicken-and-egg' problem, with both variables being measured from survey data and, more often than not, the two are even taken from the same survey 5 . It is thus conceivable that individuals respond in the same way to two questions that they believe to be quite similar. Some authors deal with this problem by employing a simultaneous equation system (e.g., Chang and Chu, 2006) , but then face the obvious difficulty of justifying the exogeneity of the instruments.
Contextual-level corruption. Only a few papers combine individual-level trust variables with contextual-level corruption measures. The most frequently cited paper is 4 Other similar studies include Lavallée et al. (2000) , Mishler and Rose (2001) , Cho and Kirwin (2007) , Lavallée et al. (2000) and Bratton (2007) . 5 Another problem with the use of 'perceptions of corruption' is that they are often biased (see Olken, 2004; and Donchev and Uhjely, 2011) . Anderson and Tverdova (2003) , who also find a negative and statistically significant effect of corruption on trust in government. Their study draws on country-level information on corruption perceptions from Transparency International, whose surveys are conducted among experts and businessmen. As such the source is not the same as the one used for the trust variable and so they are able to overcome the aforementioned 'chicken-and-egg' problem. However, the aggregate nature of this index, which mixes the opinions of different agents on different kinds of corruption, means it is not that evident how these evaluations of corruption are linked to the citizens' statements of trust. Other papers use information on corruption scandals (e.g., Chanley et al., 2000; Bowler and Karp, 2004; Kumlin and Esaiasson, 2012) , which is the kind of information we draw on here. Scandals, defined as 'accusations of corruption that have reached the general public', guarantee a closer link between the acts of corruption and citizens' evaluations of trust.
The paper most similar to ours is Bowler and Karp (2004) , which examines corruption cases related to the famous U.S. House Bank Scandal. This is the only paper that links specific corruption scandals with measures of trust at the level of the electoral district of the politicians involved in the scandal. This is also our approach, as we seek to analyse the effect of a corruption scandal involving a local incumbent on the statements of trust made by residents in the same municipality with respect to local government politicians in general. Bowler and Karp (2004) claim that a design of this type helps isolate the impact of the scandal from other potentially confounding factors. They state, for example, that it would be important to see "if voters in those districts whose legislators have engaged in scandals have a higher awareness of the scandal and a lower regard for politicians and legislative institutions than voters who live in districts whose representatives have not been caught by scandals." Measuring both corruption and trust in small electoral districts is indeed an improvement on previous studies, although as we explain below further improvements are possible.
Matching.
A problem presented by those papers that use contextual measures of corruption is that the corruption-ridden units do not necessarily have the same traits as the corruption-free units. Most papers attempt to deal with this issue by controlling for other contextual level factors in a regression framework. However, the ability of regression analysis to adjust for differences in observed covariates is well documented when the between-group differences in these covariates are substantial (e.g., Cochran, 1965; Rubin, 2001) , as is probably the case in most of the aforementioned studies. In such a situation, using matching methods to balance the distribution of covariates in the two subsamples helps reduce the bias of the estimates. Hence, the objective is to compare cases in which all the other causal variables are as similar as possible so that any difference between cases can be attributed to the treatment (see, e.g., Rubin, 1984, and Ho et al., 2007) . Here, we use propensity score matching to construct our matched sample, a technique that is the observational analog to randomization in ideal experiments (see, Rubin, 1983, and Rubin and Thomas, 2000) 6 .
A further advantage of matching is its complete transparency. The matching algorithm is applied before estimating the treatment so as to balance the covariates as far as possible in the two groups. This also ensures that the choices made at this stage by the researcher are not contaminated by the knowledge of the outcome variable or by how this choice impacts on the estimation results. As Ho et al. (2007) note, by using matching, researchers are forced to specify a priori the research design they are going to use. In our case, this effect is further enhanced by the fact that we use matching to select the municipalities in which to conduct our survey. Budget considerations mean that once the matching has been performed and the survey has been run, it is not feasible to go back and change the initial design. Thus, our design provides a full guarantee that the matched sample was selected before we obtained any information about the outcome variable (i.e., trust, obtained after conducting the survey), an ideal trait of a well-designed observational study (Rubin, 2001 ) and a task suited for the use of propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985) .
One drawback of matching is that it is only able to balance the distribution of observed covariates, so the reliability of the results depends on the richness of the set of potential control variables. Thus, matching must always be applied in conjunction with a test that helps discard the possibility that the results are driven by omitted variables.
When several years of data are available for the outcome variable (both before and after the treatment), the matching approach can be combined with either a 'difference-indifferences' method (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2009) or with the 'unconfoundedness approach' (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009) , which involves including pre-treatment outcomes in the matching procedure. Then, when applying either method, there are ways of validating the 'conditional independence' or 'un-confoundedness assumption'. This can be achieved either by identifying differences in pre-trends in the outcome variable or by testing for the effect of the treatment on outcomes in a period of time before the treatment but after the initial period. When cross-sections of data for the outcome variable are not available (as is the case here), but information on future treatments that should not have an effect on the outcome are, a 'falsification' test can be implemented (see Heckman and Hotz, 1998; Rothstein, 2010) to rule out the possibility that the effects are driven by the omission of important variables.
CORRUPTION SCANDALS IN SPAIN
The recent surge of corruption scandals. In the first two decades following the restoration of Spain's democratic local governments (1979-99) not much concern was expressed in the media, among the political elite, or the population in general about the lack of accountability or possible cases of corruption (see Jimenez and Caínzos, 2003) . This situation began to change after 1995, above all as a result of events in a booming housing market, but it did not really make itself manifest until 1999. Before that year, there had been just 46 corruption scandals, but this number was to jump to 211 during Since that date, the collapse of the housing market has reduced opportunities for corruption. Yet, the public, the media, and the judiciary have been much more sensitive to corruption during the crisis, which means that a substantial number of scandals involving earlier corrupt acts have come to light in recent years. Although we do not have a comprehensive record of these latest cases, we exploit the fact that some previously non-corrupt municipalities became corrupt after 2009 to design several 'falsification' tests.
Corruption in land use regulations. Most of the local corruption scandals that broke out in Spain in the recent past have involved bribes received by local politicians in exchange for amendments to the land use plans. Land use regulations in Spain are governed by a highly interventionist and rigid system (Riera et al., 1991) and most town planning responsibilities are in the hands of local governments. As such, municipalities draw up a 'General Plan', which provides a three-way land classification: built-up land, developable land, and non-developable land. The existence of a 'development border', a line between plots of land on which developers are allowed to build and plots where development is prohibited, is a key feature of Spain's land regulation system. In periods of high demand this border creates a rent differential, which might fuel the bribes developers are willing to pay to local politicians in exchange for shifting this border to their advantage. Although land planning is subject to participatory and transparency requirements, in practice local incumbents readily find ways of circumventing them. It is this combination of discretionary decisions and the lack of transparency that fuelled the recent surge of corruption scandals in land use regulations in Spain. Most of these scandals involve local officials that wrongfully allowed huge tracts of land to be developed, that allowed building to go ahead in places where it had been previously prohibited, or that amended the land use plan so as to permit higher construction densities in already developed land (Fundación Alternativas, 2007) .
Corruption, voting, and disaffection. In Spain, it is generally held that corrupt politicians are not punished at the polls. The press has provided intensive coverage of some highly prominent scandals and yet the incumbents accused of corruption have been re-elected. Several studies (see Fundación Alternativas, 2007, and Barberá et al., 2012) conclude that the average punishment is quite low (i.e., around 3-4% of the vote), although recent studies suggest this effect may, on occasions, be greater (Costas et al., 2012; Anduiza et al., 2012) , depending on such factors as the quality of media information, the intervention of the judiciary, the existence of clientelistic networks, and the degree of ideological polarization. There has also been considerable debate about the possible adverse effects of corruption on disaffection (which we consider as being synonymous of trust in government). Since our survey was carried out in late 2009, we completed the database for the intervening period with internet-guided searches in MyNews, a paid digital information management service covering all national and many of the regional newspapers. We screened the period that runs from 1 February 2007 to 1 November 2009 (the day this search was performed). We conducted a search for news reports containing the word combination 'corrupción urbanística' (i.e. corruption related to land planning) and each of the more than 8,000 names of the Spanish municipalities. We found 131 additional scandals breaking out during this later period 7 . In the end, the total number of scandals in our database amounted to 557.
At a later juncture in this study we also use an additional set of corruption scandals that were reported after the survey was carried out (i.e., between 2010 and 2013). More specifically, we identified 42 additional corruption scandals by performing searches in MyNews (in January 2014) in the set of municipalities previously selected as control units in our matching procedure (see section 4.2). These corruption scandals are used in performing several falsification tests. Below we provide more details on the rationale underlying these tests.
A possible criticism of our corruption measure is that it does not take into account the seriousness of the case. The reason for this is that the original files that the Fundación Alternativas shared with us only contained the name of the municipality in which the scandal broke out and a brief description of the case. Only after the survey was carried out, did we have access to information on whether the judiciary decided to investigate or prosecute the politician involved in the case 8 . Similarly, after the survey was implemented, we repeated searches in MyNews for all the cases and now have information on the number of news stories published and on the type of newspaper publishing these stories (i.e., national, regional, or local). In the sensitivity analysis (see section 5.2) we replicate our results for subsamples of scandals considered to be more serious (e.g., with wide coverage, with judicial involvement, or with coverage by national newspapers). The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained when using the whole sample although, as expected, the impact of scandals is somewhat higher for the more serious cases.
Measuring trust in local politicians
To obtain a measure of trust in local politicians at the municipal level, we designed a survey. We interviewed a sample of residents in a fraction of the municipalities in which a corruption scandal had been reported in the period 1999-2009 as well as in a number of municipalities with similar traits to those affected by corruption but which remained corruption free. The survey was undertaken in November 2009 and so the information gathered about trust in government is a reflection of the prevailing mood among Spanish citizens about politics at that time 9 . Below, we describe the Questionnaire used in the survey, the selection of Treated municipalities, and the construction of the Matched sample used as a control group.
Questionnaire. We asked respondents the following question: 'In the case of your city, do you think politicians on the local council can be trusted?'. Interviewees could
respond by selecting one of the following four alternatives: 1 ('Local politicians can never be trusted), 2 ('Local politician can almost never be trusted), 3 ('Local politicians can be trusted most of the time'), and 4 ('Local politicians can always be trusted') 10 . We used these four categories so individuals would have to indicate whether they had a high or low degree of trust, but they were then able to fine-tune their answer 11 . The proportions of individuals selecting each category were: 23.0%, 33.6%, 33.5% and 9.9%, for the categories 1 to 4, respectively. Respondents were also asked whether they believed 9 This mood was becoming more critical because of the economic crisis, but had yet to hit the levels of discontent recorded today (i.e., according to the Spanish 'Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas', the percentage of people saying that 'politicians are the country's main problem' reached 30% by the end of 2013, while it stood at 12% in November 2009, when the survey was carried out, and at 9% in September 2008, coinciding with the start of the financial crisis). Our impression is that the levels of discontent expressed at the beginning of the period are a response to the corruption scandals, while recent levels of dissatisfaction reflect the combined effect of corruption and the economic crisis. 10 An additional category 5 (Don't know -No answer) was included, but following standard procedures we do not use these responses in our analysis. 11 There is a trade-off between having too few and too many categories. Some surveys employ a dichotomous question, which has been criticized for forcing respondents to categorize themselves thus causing information loss. Other surveys employ an 11-point scale, but the outcome is often the concentration of individuals in the central categories, which are often chosen randomly (Uslaner, 2013) . The four-category scale used here falls between these two extremes and has been used in many trust surveys (e.g., the trust in government question used in the World Values Survey). corruption to be a serious problem in their municipality. They were also given four alternative replies 12 .
The survey also included questions regarding political preferences (e.g., selfreported ideology), the degree of media exposure (e.g., whether the media is the main source of information regarding the activities of the local government), and information on a set of socio-economic controls (e.g., unemployed, type of job, marital status, etc.).
Below, we provide full details for the variables used in the empirical analysis. The technical details of the survey are outlined in the Annex; the questionnaire used in the survey is available upon request.
Treated municipalities. Data limitations forced us to focus on municipalities larger than 1.000 residents 13 ; 495 out of the 557 municipalities affected by corruption scandals are that big. Because of the budget constraint we had to select a subsample of these municipalities. We selected 160 municipalities where corruption broke out as our treatment group and 130 similar municipalities as the control group. The number of control municipalities is a little lower because some of the municipalities in this group are used as controls for more than one treated municipality (see the reason why below).
In each of these municipalities, we interviewed between 20 and 50 residents, depending on population size (see also Box A.1 in the Annex). Our treated municipalities were selected taking into account the proportions of corruption scandals that broke during each of the three terms-of-office we analyze (i.e., 1999-2003, 2004-2007, 2008-2009) and also across different population sizes (i.e., less than 10.000, between 10.000 and 100.000, between 100.000 and 500.000 and larger than 500.000).
Matched sample. As for the control municipalities, these were selected using matching techniques. We constructed the matched sample using the 'propensity score'.
We estimated a Probit model, using as a dependent variable a dummy equal to one if a corruption scandal broke out in the municipality (and zero otherwise) and as regressors variables deemed to have a influence both on corruption and on the level of trust in local politician (see below) 14 . Then, the 'propensity score' was computed and control 12 This question was made at the very end of the interview, to avoid the mere mention of the word corruption to influence the answer to the trust question. 13 We lacked information on the municipal-level variables needed to implement the matching for municipalities smaller than 1,000 inhabitants. Spain has 8,114 municipalities, and 3,252 of them are larger than 1,000 inhabitants, which are the ones that belong to the control group. These municipalities include 85% of the overall population. 14 The Probit equation was estimated with information of all the 547 corrupt municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants plus all the non-corrupt municipalities with the same size. The municipalities were matched to the treatment ones based on having a similar value of the 'propensity score' 15 . The method used was the 'nearest neighbour matching with replacement'. This method allowed that a given control unit matching more than one treatment unit, which increases the average quality of matching and reduces the bias 16 .
At the same time, the method had the side benefit of allowing us to reduce the number of municipalities in the control group which, in turn, given a fixed budget, permitted us to increase a little bit the sample of treated municipalities and/or the number of interviews per municipality.
The matching strategy builds on the 'conditional independence assumption', requiring that the treatment variable (i.e., corruption) must be independent of error term conditional on the 'propensity score'. Hence, implementing the matching procedure requires choosing a set of variables that credibly satisfy this condition (see Heckman et al, 1997) . Only variables that influence simultaneously the participation decision and the outcome variable should be included. More concretely, the municipallevel variables used to estimate the Probit equation are: % Turnout (i.e., historical average of turnout in local elections), % Right voters (also as historical average), log(Population), % Unemployed, Ethnic diversity, Income per capita, % Graduate studies, % Divorced. The information of these variables comes from sources dated close to the starting year of corruption scandals in our database, so we can consider them as predetermined (see Table A .1 in the Annex for the definition and sources of these variables). Following the advice in Ho et al. (2007) we opt for a parsimonious specification where all the variables are statistically significant and help predicting the outcome. The use of this specification produced a good balance of covariates and good matches.
The choice of variables was determined by searching the literature on the determinants of corruption and trust and data availability. First, we use the historical turnout at the local elections as the main proxy for structural trust. Corruption is known random selection of corrupt municipalities (and of their twins) to be included in the surveystratified according term of corruption and population size-was done afterwards. We checked that both the original sample and the randomly selected one satisfy the balancing property. 15 Just 8 municipalities in the original sample fell outside the common support and were not included in the survey. The municipalities randomly selected for the survey satisfy this property. 16 The main risk of this matching procedure is the generation of bad matches, i.e. the distance to the nearest neighbor is too large. This problem can be solved by specifying the caliper, i.e. the maximum distance in the propensity scored allowed in any matching. In our case, however, the matching is quite good, with a 95% of the matches having an absolute distance in the 'propensity score' lower than 0.01 and all the matches having a distance lower than 0.03 which was the caliper finally used. We also tried other matching options (e.g., 'without replacement') but these did not work that well for a few larger municipalities, so we decided not to use them.
to be more prevalent in places with structurally low levels of social capital and/or low trust in government (Nannicini et al., 2013) . We also know that turnout is a good proxy for social capital and trust in government, hence the idea that places where turnout has been historically high display lower corruption levels. We computed this variable as the average over the 1987, 1991 and 1995 local elections 17 .
Second, we control for voter's ideology by including the proportion of right-wing voters. Several surveys show that the level of support for democracy in Spain is lower in the case of right-wing voters (although still very high), the reason being that the main national right-wing parties were filled with the high-ranks of Franco's regime. Some papers also suggest that right-wing voters are more tolerant with corruption and that right-wing politicians have stronger connections with private firms (Hessami, 2012) . In fact, there is some evidence for Spain suggesting that right-wing governments are especially vulnerable to developers' influences (see Viladecans-Marsal, 2012 and . Third, we control for the size of the municipality because some authors have documented that trust in government is higher the smaller is the polity (e.g., Rahn and Rudolph, 2005) and the opposite prediction has been made for political participation and accountability (e.g., Lassen and Serritzlew, 2011) and so potentially for corruption. Fourth, there is also evidence that trust is negatively affected by: belonging to a minority, living in racially mixed community, having experienced a recent traumatic experience (e.g., divorce, unemployment), and being economically unsuccessful in terms of income or education (see, e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Gustavsson and Jordahl, 2008) . There are also some works that suggest that corruption is also more prevalent in uneducated polities, and that it is also related to income, unemployment or ethnic diversity (Glaeser and Saks, 2006) .
Using the aforementioned variables we are able to balance the covariates in the two subsamples. We have performed several tests to test whether we achieved or not a good matching. First, we performed a comparison of means between treated and control units in the unmatched and matched samples (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985) . These tests are shown in Table A .2 in the Annex. In the unmatched sample, the treated group (the corruption-ridden municipalities) has lower levels of historical turnout, higher share of divorced people, and of people with graduate studies, and are more ethnically diverse and have larger population sizes, than the control group (the corruption free municipalities). In the matched sample, none of the differences in means between the 17 We tried with the whole history of turnout (i.e., turnout at the 1987, 1991 and 1995 local elections introduced separately), but the explanatory capacity of the model was not improved. treated and the control group are statistically significant. Second, we also looked ate the percentage reduction in the standardized bias as the result of the matching procedure.
The reduction in bias is substantial in all the variables that showed a statistically significant bias before the matching: % Turnout (79% drop), Ethnic diversity (86% drop), log(Population), % Graduates and % Divorced (98% drop each). Third, we also reestimated the propensity score on the matched sample and compare the pseudo-R2's before and after matching, which actually were 0.237 and 0.002, respectively. LR tests of joint significance of the regressors before and after the matching have values of 1871.77 and 2.32, with p-values of 0.000 and 0.941.
Finally, we want to make some considerations. First, as we already explained, some variables, which are plausibly correlated both with corruption and with trust, were finally excluded from the model. Although none of these variables was statistically significant, some of them had the expected sign and z-statistics close to one. These variables can be grouped into three groups: (i) additional measures of turnout (i.e., variation in turnout over the period 1987-1995, and average historical turnout measured at the provincial level), (ii) other plausible proxies of social capital (i.e., newspaper circulation or number of associations, both in per capita terms), and (iii) variables measuring corruption opportunities (i.e., population growth in the pretreatment period and specialization in the tourism industry, proxied by the percentage of vacation homes). We are going to use these variables for sensitivity checks, including them as additional controls in the regression 18 .
Second, note that our matching procedure has not dealt explicitly with the fact that corruption scandals in Spain are spatially clustered. We know, for instance, that the proportion of corrupt-ridden municipalities differs across provinces. Failure to account for these spatial influences could bias the estimated effect of corruption on trust; the response of trust to corruption will not be due to a reaction to a local scandal but the effect of the accumulation of scandals at the aggregate level and/or the effect of spatially-correlated omitted influences. Despite of this, we decided not to match at the provincial-level in order to be able to find good matches for most of our corrupt municipalities. For example, matching at the province level would have made impossible to find proper matches for the biggest cities and would have undermined the external validity of the survey (which was an explicit goal in the design of the survey). Instead, we decided to include in the Probit equation some variables measured at the aggregate provincial level as, e.g., newspapers and associations per capita, or average historical turnout. These variables were negatively correlated with corruption but their explanatory capacity was low, so we decided not to include them in the final specification. Our reading of this is that at the end many of the included variables are also spatially clustered (e.g., this is the case fore example of unemployment, income or education) so they are already capturing the spatial effects. To corroborate to which extent this is a problem we will also include these aggregate variables and also provincial fixed effects in some of the estimations. As will be shown in section five, the results do not change much after these checks.
Third, note that our sample is also balanced regarding the individual-level variables obtained from the survey (see Table A .3 for a comparison of means). This was not intended, since we did not perform any additional matching at the individual level (as suggested, e.g., in Keele, 2005) . The reason we achieve such balance is the combination of the stratification of the survey by age and gender and the fact that most individual variables are similar to the contextual ones. In any case, the fact the sample is balanced at this level means that we will be comparing levels of trust of similar individuals (in terms of the individual characteristics included in the survey) living in similar municipalities (in terms of the observable contextual variables used in the matching procedure).
Estimation method
We follow the recommendation by Ho et al. (2007) and estimate a parametric model with the data of our final matched sample. Other authors, as Rubin (2001) and Crump et al. (2009) , also recommend this procedure, suggesting that the propensity score should be used only for systematic sample selection as a precursor to regression estimation (or to more complex parametric methods). In most studies using matching techniques, the analysis performed to obtain the treatment effect is a simple difference in means (or the equivalent to a bivariate regression between the treatment indicator and the outcome, in the parametric case). However, it is well know that if the matching is not exact, this procedure can be improved by adjusting for covariates (Abadie and Imbens, 2011) .
There are several ways to perform this adjustment in a non-parametric way (Abadie and Imbens, 2011 , Rubin, 2001 , and Dehejia and Wahba, 1999 , but in the parametric case an obvious one is just to run a multivariate regression with the matched sample and the covariates used in the estimation of the propensity score. Ho et al. (2007) recommend this procedure and suggest treating the predetermined covariates as fixed, meaning that standard errors and confidence intervals should be computed as in normal regression framework 19 .
In our case, the multivariate regression has two additional advantages. First, it will allow us to use as additional covariates the individual-level information extracted from the survey 20 . The individual variables we will use as additional controls are Income, Education, Age, Female, Divorced, Unemployed, Student, Retired, and Immigrant. Controlling for individual-level variables is standard in the empirical analysis of trust (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Chang and Chu, 2006) . By doing so we are purging the trust variable from a bunch of individual traits, which means that at the end we will be comparing the level of trust for similar individuals living in municipalities with and without corruption which are also similar (by virtue of the matching procedure). Second, we can also include in the equation additional controls that were discarded from the final specification of the Probit used in the matching procedure. Third, the use of a parametric framework allows us to choose the most appropriate estimation method. In our case, the fact that our dependent variable is a categorical one means that we should use an Ordered Logit model. An alternative would be to estimate a model by collapsing the four categories into two. Actually, it is possible from the results of the Ordered Logit to test whether it is feasible to reduce the number of categories. In our case, it turns out that this option cannot be accepted, so we have to use the Ordered Logit model. The problem with logistic models is that the quantitative interpretation of the coefficients is not straightforward, so we will also provide information on the marginal probabilities.
Validation of the results
Recall that matching methods assume 'conditional independence or 'unconfoundedness' (see, e.g., Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009) , which means that -after controlling for observables-the treatment variable should not be correlated with the error term. So the main challenge of matching is having a rich enough database to control for the many variables that might influence the treatment and the outcome at the 19 In some types of matching, the parametric analysis might require some adjustment. For instance, when using 'matching with replacement', weights must be used to ensure that the parametric analysis reflects the actual observations (see Ho et al., 2005; and Dehejia and Wahba, 1999) . We take this into account in our estimation. 20 We will deal with the multilevel structure of the dataset, with individuals belonging to different municipalities, by clustering standard errors at the municipality level. same time. This is the reason we looked at a very broad set of possible covariates to be included in the first-stage of our matching procedure (see section 4.2). We showed that a subset of them did a good job in predicting the occurrence of corruption and we will also perform some robustness checks to show that the omission of the variables discarded at this stage is not affecting the results. Nevertheless, in addition of these efforts, we will also perform some 'falsification' tests to validate the matching results.
'Falsification' tests are common in economics (see, e.g., Heckman and Hotz, 2004, and Rothstein, 2010) . The idea of using also turnout is based on the fact that this is the variable that works better as a measure of structural trust (as we already argued in the previous section). So, we expect that corruption scandals breaking out after the trust survey was carried out should not have any effect on the stated levels of trust (or of perception of corruption). We also expect that corruption scandals breaking out after the 2007 local elections but before the survey was carried out should not have any effect on turnout in that contest 21 . A finding that municipalities experiencing a scandal after the survey also display lower levels of trust or perception of corruption (and/or that municipalities with post-election scandals also have lower turnout) would suggest that the cross-sectional matching estimates of the effects of scandals on trust are driven by un-observables. A finding that future scandals do not have any impact on trust or turnout would reinforce the confidence in the matching estimates. To design these falsification tests we need outcome data for units that experienced a scandal before the outcome was realized and also for units after that event. The long period over which corruption scandals arose means that this is indeed the case 22 .
The first type of 'falsification' test uses trust and corruption perception data and relies on the fact that many more corruption scandals broke out since our survey was carried out. Although we do not have a complete record of corruption scandals that broke out in the period 2010-2013, we knew from the press that the phenomenon 21 In this case there is the additional worry that individuals might modify their answer of the turnout question after knowing about a corruption scandal which occurred between the 2007 elections and the 2009 survey (e.g., individuals could say that they did not vote despite having voted after knowing about the scandal). Note also that a finding that future corruption does not affect past turnout coupled with a finding that past corruption did have an effect on turnout (we are also going to present these results) would also discard this other source of bias. 22 Note that to design such tests we don't need data for several cross-section of either trust or turnout. This is an advantage of this type of test given that our survey was carried only once.
continued with a similar level of intensity than before 23 . This information suggested to us that it would be worthwhile to do an additional search in MyNews and try to find additional news reports related to corruption amongst the 130 municipalities selected as controls using our matching procedure (and that therefore, did not experience any corruption scandal before the survey was carried out). These searches where performed during January 2014 and we find a total of 42 municipalities where a corruption scandal broke out during the period 2010-2013 24 . After having identified this group, we compare the level of trust (or the perception of corruption) of these municipalities the one of municipalities that never experienced a corruption scandal. The problem in this case is that these two groups cannot be considered comparable in terms of observables (i.e., the propensity score of the first group was higher than for the second). In order to ensure that the treatment and control groups are comparable, we use the propensity score estimated before (see section 4.2) with the sample of 130 municipalities. We select twins for each of the treated units using 'nearest neighbour matching with replacement' with a 0.03 caliper and dropping the observations that fall outside the common support (this is the procedure that we used to select our initial matched sample). We obtain a final sample consisting of 75 municipalities, 38 of them in the treatment group and 37 in the control group 25, 26 , that we use to estimate an Ordered Logit model as before. Note that these two samples are identical in terms of observables and that if un-observables are unimportant we should not find differences in levels of trust between them. So, if we find that corrupt municipalities still display lower levels of trust (or perception of corruption) this would be indicative that our main results were driven by omitted variables that are correlated both with the treatment and the outcome. 23 For example, in an article published in mid 2013, El País speaks of a total of about 800 corruption cases ("Corruption reached 800 cases and nearly 2000 arrested during a decade", El País 17 th June 2013). Recall that our database contains 557 corruption scandals that broke out before November 2009. Although, the number of cases in the two sources is probably not completely comparable, the numbers suggest that the trend in the appearance of corruption scandals persisted after our survey was carried out. 24 This number might seem very high at first sight (it represents a 32% of the total) but note that the predicted probability of becoming corrupt (i.e., the value of the propensity score) was also very high for this group (i.e., 0.37, compared to a value of 0.21 for the municipalities that where not corrupt neither before or after the survey was carried out). 25 Note that in this case we lost only 4 treated municipalities that fell outside of the common support. Also, each control is the twin of one treated municipality in all the cases but one. 26 As with the original matched sample, our procedure guarantees that this sample is balanced in terms of both contextual and individual variables. The tables comparing the means of treated and controls are not included to save space but are available upon request.
The second 'falsification' test is based on individual turnout data and has been easier to design, since when we selected the random sample of treated units we already included a share of scandals that we knew broke out after the 2007 local elections. So, in this case, we simply estimate the Ordered Logit for two different subsamples, with scandals breaking out before vs. after the 2007 local elections. Both subsamples include the treated municipalities and their respective twins. The third 'falsification' test is based on turnout data aggregated at the municipal level. This test is usually named a 'un-confoundedness' test and has been proposed to assess the validity of this assumption when using matching with pooled data (see Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009 ).
So, to perform this test, several cross-sections of the outcome variable are needed. The idea is to use the history of the outcome as conditioning variables in the first-state Probit equation. Then, at least one of the cross-sections of data that precede the treatment should be reserved to implement the test. The test looks at the effect of the (future) treatment on the outcome in a pre-treatment period once controlling for the history of the outcome. In our case, we don't have data on the history of trust or individual turnout decisions. However, we do have information on the aggregate levels of turnout at the municipality level for the elections previous to the start of the corruption scandal epidemic (recall that our first scandal occurred in 2000). This means that we can control the history of turnout (i.e., average turnout at the 1987, 1991 and 1995 elections) when looking at the effects of future corruption scandals (post 1999) on turnout at the 1999 elections. A finding that future corruption has an effect over past turnout (after controlling for the previous history of turnout) would suggest that our results are driven by some shocks that (during the period analysed) affected simultaneously the level of turnout (and hence possibly the level of trust) and the probability that a scandal breaks out.
RESULTS
Main results
The results of the estimation of the Ordered Logit model using the matched sample selected as we explained in the previous section are presented in Table 1 . The first four columns report the results of the effect of corruption on the level of trust in local politicians, while the last two columns use the perception of corruption as the dependent variable. The results suggest that the occurrence of a corruption scandal has a negative and statistically significant effect (at the 1% level) on trust in local politicians.
This results holds whenever we adjust or not for historical turnout (a proxy of the previous level of trust in the municipality), for all the contextual-level variables, and for the individual characteristics 27 . This provides an additional validation of the capacity of our matching procedure to balance observable characteristics. The table also shows that corruption scandals also have a statistically significant effect on the perception of corruption. Note that a precondition for declaring lower trust after a scandal should be that one is aware of this higher level of corruption. So, the results regarding perceptions of corruption enhance our confidence on the fact that the drop in trust is due to the occurrence of a corruption scandal.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2] The fact that the effects of corruption scandals on trust in government are negative and statistically significant does not necessarily mean that these effects are quantitatively meaningful. One drawback of the Ordinal Logit model is that the size of the estimated coefficient cannot be directly interpreted. The interpretation requires the computation of the marginal effects of a corruption scandal in each of the four categories of trust. In Table 2 we present these marginal effects, computed as the difference in the predicted value of the probability of as the corruption dummy changes from zero to one, while all others are held constant at their mean value 28 .
Looking at the first row of Table 2 , we can see that when a corruption scandal breaks out an additional 5.1% of the whole population state that 'Local politicians can never be trusted' (category 1), and an additional 1.7% states that 'Almost never can a local politician be trusted' (category 2). Conversely, after a corruption scandal the population states that 'Local politicians can be trusted most of the time' (category 3) drops by a 4.5% and the population stating that 'Local politicians can be always trusted' (category 4) drops by a 2.4%. Overall, it seems that around a 7% of the population shift from trusting to not trusting politicians as a results of a corruption scandal. 27 Note that the explanatory capacity of the individual variables is much higher than the one of the contextual ones (see F-test at the bottom of the table). At the contextual level, only historical turnout and population size have an effect on trust. At the individual level, people that are rich and old, and also students and immigrants tent to trust more local politicians. People divorced tend to trust local politicians less. Unemployment and education have the expected negative and positive sign, but the coefficients are not statistically significant. Complete results are available upon request.
In order to judge whether these are small or big numbers we should put them in perspective. First of all, we could look at the effect of corruption on the proportions of individuals in each category. Note for instance that in a corrupt-free municipality, around a 10% of the individuals are located in category 4 (see row four in Table 2) Table 2 and the effects are striking.
In the two extreme categories (1 and 4) the effects of corruption scandals on trust amount to around +45%, +16%, -37% and -31% of one standard deviation for the categories 1 to 4, respectively. If again we add together the two high and the two low trust categories we find effects of +30% and of -33% of one standard deviation for the low and high trust groups, respectively. These effects are quite sizeable: scandals seem to be able to undo a great part of the differences in trust levels across municipalities.
Finally, another way to judge the magnitude of these effects is to compare them to estimates of the average effects of corruption scandals on the vote for the incumbent and on turnout. The literature has estimated small effects of scandals on the vote, of around 2% in the US case (e.g., Peters and Welch, 1981) and of 3-4% in the Spanish one (Costas et al., 2012) . So, the effects of corruption on trust we find (i.e., that 7% of people moving from high to low trust categories) seem relatively large. Also, this effect is lower than the one we will get in section 5.2 below when analysing the effect of corruption scandals on turnout, which will be around 1.5%. One reason for this larger effect could be that disaffected people might react in very different ways: voting against the corrupt incumbent, abstaining, voting for radical parties, or voting blank or null. Table 3 [Insert Table 3] All these 'falsification' tests point into the same direction: corruption scandals happening after the individual answered the questionnaire (or voted at local elections) did have no effect on the stated level of trust or on the perception of corruption (or on the turnout decision). Only events happening before the survey was carried out (or before local elections) matter. Overall, the results of these 'falsification' tests improve our confidence on the job done by the matching on controlling for the most relevant variables than jointly influence corruption and trust. Table 1 are robust to the inclusion in the equation of additional controls and to the use of different definitions of corruption. All these sensitivity checks are presented in Table A .5 in the Annex. The first three columns replicate results adding to the equation the variables that where discarded in the estimation of the Probit equation but that had z-statistics close to one. The first column controls for additional measures of turnout (i.e., variation in turnout over the period 29 Individual turnout data might be subject to some biases as individuals tend to over-report past turnout. In our survey, for example, turnout is around 82% while real turnout at the 2007 local elections was 74%. Also, our main control for historical turnout was build using aggregate data. These are the reasons we present results using both individual and aggregate data. The results found are however very similar. The size of the coefficients differs because when using individual data we estimate a Probit while when using aggregate data we estimate a simple OLS.
Validation of the results
Falsification tests.
Sensitivity checks. The main results shown in
1987-1995, and average historical turnout measured at the provincial level), the second for other plausible proxies of social capital (i.e., newspaper circulation or number of associations, both in per capita terms), and the third for variables measuring corruption opportunities (i.e., population growth in the pre-treatment period and specialization in the tourism industry, proxied by the percentage of vacation homes). The fourth column of this table also presents results when adding region fixed effects to the estimation to see whether the decision not to force the matching to happen at the regional level had any influence on the results. The results do not change much in none of these cases.
Finally, columns five to seven replicate the estimation using different measures of corruption that take into account the seriousness of the case. Column five focus on the scandals that are more widely covered by the press, column six on the cases with judiciary intervention, and column seven on the cases covered by national newspapers.
The results are also qualitatively similar than the ones obtained when using the whole sample.
Heterogeneous effects
The results presented up to know are a measured of the effect of a corruption scandal on the average citizen. It might be, however, that some citizens are more sensitive to corruption scandals than others. The two main motives for this higher sensitivity that one finds in the literature are the degree of ideological attachment to the party involved in the corruption scandal and the amount of information about corruption. The seminal paper by Anderson and Tverdova (2003) already showed that partisans tend to react less to corruption than non-partisans. Anduiza et al. (2013) have recently replicated these results with an Internet experiment. Other papers have already documented the effect of exposure to information about corruption on vote for the incumbent (e.g., Klansja, 2011) and turnout (e.g., Chong et al., 2012) .
[Insert Table 4 ] Table 4 presents the results obtained when we allow the effect of corruption scandals on trust to be different across these two dimensions: (i) ideological attachment between the voter and the corrupt incumbent and (ii) exposure to media information.
To compute the first variable we rely on two sources of information. The first one is a self-classification of the individual respondents to the survey on an ideological scale (1=extreme left, 2=left, 3= centre, 4=right, and 5=extreme right). The second one is a classification of the ideology of the mayor's party made on the same scale 30 . With this information we computed two variables: Ideology(Incumbent) is a dummy equal to one if the voter and the mayor at the moment of the survey had the same ideology and zero if not, while Ideology(Corrupt) is a dummy equal to one if the voter has the same ideology of the party of the mayor involved in the scandal 31 . Our prior is that the variable that mediates the effect of corruption on trust is the ideological attachment with the party accused of corruption (i.e., Ideology(Corrupt)). However, we include also an interaction with the party of the actual mayor because this is what the previous literature did before and also because some papers have already shown that voters tend to trust more the government when they voted for the party in power (see Keele, 2005) .
The other interaction is with a dummy called Media exposure which is equal to one if the individual declares to obtain information about the activities of the local government only or mostly from the media, as opposed to only or mostly from grapevine sources of information (e.g., family, friends) or from the local government itself (e.g., though pamphlets or government organized meetings).
The results are shown in Table 4 . The first column replicates the average results for the new sample, since some individuals did not answer the questions required to compute these variables. The average effect of corruption on trust is the same than before. Columns (ii) and (iii) include the interaction with the two ideological attachment variables, one at a time, including also the variable Ideology(Incumbent) as a control. It turns out that only the interaction between Corruption and Ideology(Corrupt) is statistically significant. This result is maintained when we include both interactions at the same time in column (iv). The results suggest that corruption scandals have a smaller effect on the trust in local government of voters who are ideologically attached to the party involved in the scandal (actually or in the past). The results also show that 30 Most mayors belong to a national or regional party and, since there are just a few of them and their ideological position is well known, their classification entails no problem. The main difficulty is due to the fact that some mayors belong run under a local party and it is not always easy to grasp which is the ideology based on the party's name. In these cases we classified the party as a centrist one. Then, we performed some sensitivity checks: we used just two big categories (left vs. right) instead of five, we included the centrist parties either on one or the other group, and we keep or drop the individuals located at the extremes. Detailed information about the classifications used is available upon request. 31 The survey also asked individuals the name of the party they voted for in the previous 2007 local elections. We decided not to use this variable because it is clearly endogenous to the occurrence of a corruption scandal. One might think that even the ideological self-placement is endogenous; note, however, that this variable is perfectly balanced between the treatment and control samples (see Table A .4 in the Annex).
voters that are ideologically close to the actual incumbent also display higher levels of trust in government. Column (v) presents the results when including the interaction with Media exposure: these results suggest that corruption scandals have a larger detrimental effect on trust on individuals that declare to obtain the information mostly from media sources. Note also this is compatible with the fact that individuals obtaining information from the media tend to show higher levels of trust in government. Column (vi) is our preferred specification, which includes at the same time the interactions with [Insert Table 5] Overall, the results shown in this table show that corruption scandals have a larger effect on a subset of individuals: the less ideological and more informed ones. In order to gauge the magnitude of the effects for different groups of voters, Table 5 Table 2 ). Note also that the increase (decrease) in the number of voters in the lowest (highest) trust category (second row of panel (ii)) is now around 40% (this number was around a 24% before). Also, the marginal effect represents a +77%, +24.5%, -64.2% and -45.0% of one standard deviation in categories 1 to 4, respectively (recall that these numbers were much lower in Table 2 ). Second, the effects are close to zero for the ideological and uninformed voters (category (iii)). Third, the effects for the other two categories (i.e., (i) ideological but informed, and (iv) non-ideological but un-informed) are in between those of the two already mentioned groups, and the effects are a little bit larger for informed but ideological voters than for the un-informed and non-ideological. Although both ideological attachment and exposure to media information seem to mediate the effects of scandals on trust in local government, the impact of access to information is larger than the one of ideological attachment between voters and corrupt politicians.
CONCLUSION
Local corruption scandals can have a very detrimental effect on the level of trust of citizens on local politicians. This is what we have found in this paper. On average, we find that around 7% of people moved from the high-trust to the low-trust categories after a corruption scandal. This number might seem small, but it becomes quite large when compared with the actual number of people in low trust categories and/or with the standard deviation of this proportion across municipalities. This number is also bigger than the proportion of votes lost by corrupt incumbents (see, e.g., Peters and Welch, 1980 ; and specifically for local incumbents in Spain, Barberá et al., 2012, and Costas et al., 2012) . Moreover, we also find in the paper that the size of this effect is much higher for individuals who are not ideologically attached to the incumbent involved in the corruption scandal and/or that obtaining information from the media. In this case, the proportion of people shifting from high to low categories of trust in the relevant subpopulation is much higher, around an 11%. Overall, the results suggest that corruption scandals are able to destroy a great proportion of the differences in trust across localities. This might have at the end real consequences on decisions made by individuals, going from abstentions (we also showed that turnout decreased after scandals) to increased demonstrations and protests, or even a reduction of tax compliance and other indicators of civic behaviour. These aspects will be analysed in future work. Notes: (1) See Table 1 . (2) Ideology (Incumbent)= dummy equal to one if the individual is ideologically close to the actual incumbent; Ideology (Corrupt) = dummy equal to one if the individual is ideologically close to the incumbent involved in a corruption scandal (that might or might not coincide with the actual one); Media exposure = dummy equal to one if the individual obtains the information regarding the activity of the local government mostly from the media (instead of grapevine sources or the local government itself). This sample is representative in three dimensions: i) when the corruption scandals broke out; ii) the municipality size (in terms of population); iii) and their geographical location (by province). The number of individuals interviewed varies according to the municipality size. 20 individuals were interviewed in municipalities with less than 10.000 inhabitants; 40 if 10.000<Population 100.000; 50 if 100.000<Population 500.000; and 100 if Population>500.000. The final sample is composed by 9060 interviews. This sample is also representative in terms of individual characteristics (gender and age) regarding these characteristics for the whole Spanish population and by municipality size.
In order to have a high response rate, the survey was designed to be answered in five minutes. In order to avoid conditioning the answer to the questions, it was organized as follows. First, there were basic filter questions regarding gender, age, nationality and municipality where the individual is registered. These questions were used to design a representative sample. Then, the question about trust was stated. Then, there was a bloc of questions regarding voting decisions and individuals' information. Finally, several sociodemographic characteristics where asked.
≤ ≤ (3) Provincial effects: one dummy for each of the 50 Spanish provinces. (3) Wide coverage = dummy equal to one if number of news stories higher than the one predicted by population size, Judicial intervention = dummy equal to one if the judiciary has decided to investigate of prosecute the politician involved in the corruption scandal, National press = dummy equal to one if the scandal has been covered by a newspaper with national coverage. (4) When using the different corruption definitions the sample included the municipalities treated by the narrow definition of corruption plus their corresponding twins.
